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Abstract:   
Ecosystems provide great benefit to society and economies throughout the world.  
Unfortunately, due to their nature as public goods, markets related to their supply often 
see failure.  The conservation of many of these ecosystems is vital to the health of the 
planet, humanity and the economy.  The goods and services ecosystems provide are not 
restricted by border.  As developed countries take stronger roles by investing in 
conservation and environmental production within their own borders, developing 
countries struggle to follow their example.  The main reason for this is their diminished 
ability to pay for such conservation.  Their short-term needs, such as poverty reduction, 
tend to overshadow long-term needs, such as conserving a sustainable environment.  
Therefore it is necessary that developed countries compensate developing countries for 
the conservation of ecosystems of which they receive the greatest benefit. 
 
I. Introduction 
 Every economy is built upon various forms of capital.  These include built, 
human, social and natural capitals.  It is interesting however that natural capital is often 
the most misunderstood in traditional economics.  The value of all of the goods and 
services we receive from the environment is grossly underappreciated in typical 
economic behavior.  People, in many cases, fail to perceive the true value of these goods 
and then free-ride off of the current services offered by ecosystems such as tropical 
forests.  This is particularly the case in developing countries that are unable to pay for the 
conservation of these rich ecosystems.  The value of these goods and services is also 
underappreciated in terms of other markets to which these ecosystem services are related.  
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For example, the timber industry often disregards the ecological impact tree harvesting 
has, due to a lack of incentive.  When tropical forest land use is subject to behavior such 
as timber development, it is usually because forest owners receive little to no 
compensation for the services these forests generate1.  Nevertheless, in many cases the 
costs of harvesting the trees of a forest outweigh the benefits thereof.  Our goal in the 
case of conservation is sustainability, which Voinov and Farley describe as “the goal of 
keeping something at a certain level, of avoiding decline.”2  Maintaining the optimum 
level of “ecosystem services” is vital to the survival of humanity as many of these 
services provide a basis for life itself. 
 Ecosystem services carry the characteristics of public goods.  As a result, they 
must be treated as such.  Also, markets related to marketable products associated with the 
exploitation of tropical forests3 (what we will call forest products) result in externalities 
that must be addressed.  Examples of forest products include timber, land, agricultural 
products, oil, etc.  Both of these market failures can be resolved through methods that 
allow for compensation in return for conservation of vital ecosystems.  As conservation is 
a difficult objective for developing countries struggling to become economically 
competitive it is necessary that developed countries pay for the benefit they receive from 
these ecosystem services provided by tropical forests in return for their conservation. 
 The next section will explain the characteristics of ecosystem services as well as a 
brief history of economic thought concerning their role in the economies of the world.  
                                                 
1
 Nahuelhual, Laura, Pablo Donoso, Antonio Lara, Daisy Núñez, Carlos Oyarzún and Eduardo Neira 
“Valuing Ecosystem Services of Chilean Temperate Rainforests,”  Environment, Development and 
Sustainability.  Vol. 9, No. 4 (November 2007), pp. 495 
2
 Voinov, Alexey and Joshua Farley. “Reconciling Sustainability, Systems Theory and Discounting.” 
Ecological Economics, Vol. 63, No. 1 (June 2007), pp. 106 
3
 Unlike ecosystem services, marketable products associated with the exploitation of tropical forests have a 
defined value on the commodities market.  We will simplify this term to “forest products” from here on. 
 3 
Section three will provide a look at the two types of market failure involved with this 
suboptimum level of conservation, as well as consider an optimum level of conservation.  
Section four will include a short discussion regarding an Ecuadorian case-study in which 
a block of the Amazon Forest is considered.  Section five will display a wide array of 
policy suggestions that accomplish the difficult goal of paying developing countries for 
the conservation of their forests.  Lastly, section six will conclude. 
 
II. Ecosystem Services 
Simply defined, ecosystem services are the goods and services generated from the 
natural processes and components of any given ecosystem.4  While the term “ecosystem 
services” is representative of both goods and services it has been traditionally shortened 
for the sake of simplicity.5   
In 1998 an article titled “The value of the world’s ecosystem services and natural 
capital” by Roberts Costanza, et al., became a seminal piece of work in the world of 
ecological economics.  In this article Costanza, et al., claim that the global economy 
would be significantly different today if ecosystem services were paid for.6  This means 
that “the price of commodities using ecosystem services directly or indirectly would be 
much greater.”7  Encompassing all of these good and services into the global economy 
would undoubtedly reshape its structure.8  In evaluating such services Costanza, et al., 
                                                 
4
 Nahuelhual, et al. 484 
5
 Costanza, Robert, et. al  “The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital,”  Ecological 
Economics.  Vol. 25, No. 1 (April 1998), pp. 3-15 
6
 Costanza, et al. 14 
7
 Id. 14 
8
 Kaiser, Brooks and James Roumasset. “Valuing Indirect Ecosystem Services; The Case of Tropical 
Watersheds.”  Environment and Development Economics.  Vol. 7, No. 4 (October 2002); pp. 701-714 
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suggests a global annual value between US$16-54 trillion9 with an estimated average of 
approximately US$33 trillion for ecosystem services as of 1998.  These figures represent 
a dollar amount 1.8 times the global GNP in 1998.10  This robust number certainly 
requires that society as well as most economists reconsider the value of nearly every 
product throughout the global economy.  Even if this figure is only half right it is clear 
that we must begin to consider ecosystem services as a contributor to our social and 
economic well-being. 
One of the main reasons for this undervaluation of ecosystem services pertains to 
the lack of information society possesses regarding their actual value.  There are many 
that argue the feasibility of evaluating such services, but we do so each and every day.11  
Many insurance companies make their business based on the idea that intangible goods, 
such as ecosystem services, (human life, etc.) can be evaluated at some price level.  
Barbier acknowledges that “our knowledge of the ecological functions, let alone the 
ecosystem processes and components underlying many (services) is still incomplete.”12   
 Today there are twenty-three recognized ecosystem services (see Appendix 1).13  
It may be easier to consider this topic by looking at one specific ecosystem service.  
Carbon sequestration14 is certainly one of the most covered ecosystem services in modern 
politics and media.  Trees have the capability to absorb some level of carbon dioxide, the 
                                                 
9
 Note:  The methods for finding such figures are in constant development.  Two schools developing 
methods for assessing the monetary value of ecosystem services are the Gund Institute of Ecological 
Economics at the University of Vermont and Stanford University 
10
 Costanza, et al. 14 
11
 Id. 6 
12
 Barbier, Edward B. “Valuing Ecosystem Services.”  Economic Policy.  (January 2007); pp. 212 
13
 Asia Pacific Environmental Exchange.  Ecosystem Services Enhanced by Salmon Habitat Conservation 
in the Green/Duwamish and Central Puget Sound Watershed.  Seattle, WA: Asia Pacific Environmental 
Exchange.  (February 2005); pp.10-11 
14
 Carbon sequestration: The storage of carbon dioxide over an extended period of time within plants, trees, 
the ground and the ocean, that results in a drop in its atmospheric levels. 
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most ubiquitous greenhouse gas, inhibiting much of its release into our atmosphere.  The 
process of carbon sequestration, therefore, induces some degree of societal benefit.  As a 
public good, however, this service is currently unmarketable due to a market failure, of 
which we will detail later.  While this may be the case, it is economically realistic to 
expect beneficiaries to pay for this benefit as they should for a service in any given 
market. 
 Paying for said services, nevertheless, is relatively unreasonable at this point in 
time.  The truth of the matter is that there is technically no current market for ecosystem 
services (though carbon sequestration has sometimes been linked to carbon credit 
systems15).  The main cause for this problem is the non-excludable nature of ecosystem 
services.  They bear the characteristics of a public good and as such are undervalued by 
the world’s population.  Unfortunately, ecosystem services carry all of the traits that 
suggest a public goods market failure with the potential for externalities in associated 
markets. 
 
III. Market Failure 
3.1 Public Goods 
 Pure public goods have two overarching properties, which Brown, et al.16, 
describe as non-excludability17 and jointness of supply18.  Resulting from these 
                                                 
15
 A carbon credit system can be defined as a market that allows the trade of carbon dioxide permits, which 
then allow a certain level of released emissions.  Some countries (i.e. Indonesia, etc.) suggest that carbon 
credits could be a way of compensating a forest owner for the conservation of their property.  This idea will 
be discussed further along in the paper. 
16
 Brown, Stephen N., David Price and Satish Raichur.  “Public-Good Theory and Bargaining between 
Large and Small Countries.”  International Studies Quarterly.  Vol. 20, No. 3 (September 1976); pp. 396. 
17
 Brown, et al., claim that non-excludability is when one country consumes a good, and in doing so all 
other countries consume a similar amount of that same good 
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MB 
S = MC 
Qo Q’ 
Public Goods Market (Figure 1) 
Units of Conservation/ 
Ecosystem Services 
Price 
DWL 
Where MC=MB we have the optimum quantity Qo.  
Without any form of demand the current quantity level 
is at Q’.  The deadweight loss is reflected by DWL.  
characteristics is a scenario referred to as free-riding.  Nunn and Watkins describe this as 
when “self-interested members of a large group fail to engage in collectively profitable 
action.”19  This means that these particular members, of a community for example, have 
low to no willingness to pay for the benefit received from a public good.  Since they are 
not faced with any kind of monetary fee for the use of this good they have little incentive 
to pay for it.  As such, we are directed to a public goods model in which this dissociation 
between demand and marginal benefit, and the implications thereof, is revealed. 
Looking at the Public Goods 
model (figure 1) we can see that at some 
level of conservation, Q’, there is a gross 
underallocation of resources towards 
conservation.  It should also be 
considered that each unit of conservation 
is also an increase in the supply of 
ecosystem services.  It must first be 
noted that demand for ecosystem services 
doesn’t exist in a marketable sense (or if it does 
it is practically non-existent).  Demand may be reflected in minimal contemporary 
conservation efforts (typically through environmental or governmental organizations); 
however we will assume no demand in this model.   
                                                                                                                                                 
18
 Brown, et al., says that jointness of supply is when consumption of a specific good by a single country 
does not reduce its supply for another country. 
19
 Nunn, Geoffrey E. and Thayer H. Watkins. “Public Goods Games.” Southern Economic Journal. Vol. 
45, No. 2. (Oct., 1978); pp. 598 
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To analyze this model and understand this lack of demand, let us first consider 
what makes up demand.  Demand, of course, is the representation of ability and 
willingness to pay for a particular good or service.  Interestingly, those who are able to 
consume the benefits of many of these ecosystem services are not restricted by border as 
they include citizens from countries all over the world. 
The “willingness to pay” area of demand, as discussed, is subject to free-riding.  
This is a pervasive issue in a public goods market, as people consume ecosystem services 
without paying for them due to their non-excludable nature20.  However, if governments 
were to represent their citizens, thereby paying for conservation on their behalf, it is 
likely that we would see a rise in the quantity of conservation demanded (and therefore 
an improved level of ecosystem services).  When considering ecosystem services we 
must remember that they are not a commodity per se.  We are not technically paying for 
the production of an additional unit of ecosystem services with every increased unit of Q; 
rather with each increase in Q we are ensuring the conservation of at least that many 
units of ecosystem services.  In this, every unit of conservation is equal to some avoided 
reduction in ecosystem services. 
When the “ability to pay” portion of demand is considered it should be 
understood that many developing countries are simply unable to comply with the goals of 
conservation.  Sheeran makes the case that “preserving natural resources, though 
necessary for achieving sustainable economic development in the long run, is a costly 
strategy for developing countries where the overriding economic and social priority is 
                                                 
20
 Costanza, et al. 4 
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poverty alleviation.”21  Short-run priorities such as poverty reduction often take political 
priority over attempts to fix ills of the long-run.  This can be somewhat attributed to the 
lack of a stable government in many of these countries where, as Didia puts it, “the 
government is… preoccupied with survival in office.”22  Without this concern political 
leaders are freer to pursue long-term goals of sustainability throughout their economy.  
As such, we can attribute some of this difference between demand and marginal benefit 
to a decreased “ability to pay” for conservation from developing countries. 
These issues related to “ability and willingness to pay” help provide a background 
as to why demand falls short of marginal benefit in our public goods model.  The 
deadweight loss associated with this underallocation of resources is represented by the 
triangle marked DWL.  As stated earlier the “willingness to pay” issue can be solved 
when the government can assume the funding of conservation through compensating 
owners of ecosystems such as tropical forests.  This allows for the elimination of free-
riding on the part of individuals.  To make certain that this issue doesn’t take place on an 
international scale it may be that a supranational organization (such as the UN, World 
Bank, or another organization) takes control of compensatory tactics.  We can also 
address the “ability to pay” situation through such a program.  This would allow for 
developed countries to pay developing countries, which possess much of the world’s 
forests, to conserve.  Regulations such as these may allow for a greater contribution of 
resources towards conservation/ecosystem services, reflected in a demand closer aligned 
to the marginal benefit of such services. 
                                                 
21
 Sheeran, Kristin A. “Forest Conservation in the Phillippines: A Cost-Effective Approach to Mitigating 
Climate Change?” Ecological Economics. Vol. 58 (2006); 348. 
22
 Didia, Dal. “Debt-for Nature Swaps, Market Imperfections, and Policy Failures.” World Development 
Report 1994. Oxford University Press. (1994); pp. 482. 
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Many economists argue that the cure for a public goods market failure is private-
ownership.  These forests and ecosystems affected by conservation programs often must 
have appropriately controlled property rights.  Didia asserts that “in the aggregate, 
landowners will manage their land better than the government or any other institution.”23  
However, if this were the case private owners would need to be subjected to strict land 
use regulation.  Any kind of disturbance within a given area of some tropical forest could 
seriously affect the ecosystems that it may neighbor.  Costanza, et al., contends that the 
smallest of disturbances may shift an ecosystem to a state that results in potentially dire 
social and economic consequences.24  Accordingly, ecosystems have fairly unclear 
thresholds25 in which they can take on resource depletion.26  Unless these ecosystem 
thresholds can be accurately identified it will be difficult to maintain efficient resource 
extraction projects.  Whether public land, that retains these ecosystem services, is owned 
by private individuals or the government should not particularly matter to those funding 
conservation.  Either land owner type would ultimately be paid for their services, 
assuming a public goods cure.    Efficiency, in this regard, is specifically tied to the 
efficient management of ecosystem resources that reside on, what is now, public land. 
 
3.2 Externalities 
 Ecosystem services present themselves as externalities in marketable forest 
resource markets.  Forest land provides both indirect and direct ecosystem services.  
Direct goods and services, such as timber, oil, minerals, agricultural uses, etc. are 
                                                 
23
 Didia 483 
24
 Costanza 212 
25
 By using the term threshold we are speaking about the specific amount of resource depletion an 
ecosystem can assume before its benefit to society are exceeded by its cost. 
26
 Id. 212 
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typically represented in forest product markets.  Indirect ecosystem services, such as 
carbon sequestration (see climate regulation), soil retention, and water regulation, have 
less of a direct role in these resource markets. These markets for forest products often fail 
to consider the costs to society associated with ecosystem service loss when some of 
these direct goods are extracted.  Many of these ecosystem services are interconnected, as 
stated earlier, thus the removal of one ecosystem service from an ecosystem may reduce 
the value of one or more other ecosystem services in that same region. 
Though not the main objective of this section it is important to consider that forest 
products, which are marketable, are subject to the tragedy of the commons.  “Tragedy of 
the commons” is a concept most notably considered by Garret Hardin in 1968.27  In this 
essay Hardin suggests that a person seeks to increase their utility withstanding no limit, 
while in reality some limit certainly does exists for all goods that they may exploit.28  
This is an issue that applies to forest products as we have discussed them.  These forms of 
capital are often removed for their marketable uses, which also removes the ecosystem 
services they provide.  The over-harvesting of these marketable forest products results in 
high costs to society in the form of ecosystem services depletion.  If forest products are 
harvested so to will be ecosystem services. 
 So as we consider the markets for direct good forest products (such a timber, 
agriculture, land, oil, etc.) it is important to understand the loss of various ecosystem 
services that comes with the production of these direct good forest products.  Barbier and 
Burgess back up this idea in stating that “pricing and economic policy influencing 
tropical forest land use decisions rarely take into account the foregone environmental 
                                                 
27
 Hardin, Garret. "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science, Vol. 162, No. 3859 (December 13, 1968), pp. 
1243-1248. 
28
 Id. 1244 
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S reflects the PMC of exploiting forest products.  The result 
is Q’.  SMC is greater than PMC.  If S reflected SMC the 
result would be Qo.  The difference between Qo and Q’ is 
the oversupply of forest products.  DWL represents the 
deadweight loss to society. 
benefits of forest conversion.”29  In short, forest products may be oversupplied due to the 
effect their production has on ecosystem services. 
 The externality model 
(figure 2) displays the over-
allocation of resources to forest 
products.  As can be seen, the social 
marginal cost (SMC) of forest 
resource production exceeds the 
supply of forest products, which 
equals private marginal cost 
(PMC).  Ideally supply should be equal 
to social marginal cost; however that is 
not the case here.  Where S=PMC crosses demand (D) the level of quantity produced is 
Q’, whereas when SMC crosses demand the level of output is Qo.  The result of this over-
allocation of resources towards forest products is a deadweight loss, displayed by the 
triangle DWL.  This deadweight loss represents the loss of welfare incurred by society as 
a result of an over-allocation of resources. 
 For instance, commercial logging is a significant factor in deforestation within 
Latin America and Africa.30  The removal of trees from an ecosystem comes with various 
other actions as well.  For example roads must be built, which disrupts the natural process 
of these forests.  There is also the risk of costly pollution when any kind of machinery 
                                                 
29
 Barbier, E.B. and J.C. Burgess. “The Economics of Tropical Deforestation.”  Issues in Environmental 
Economics  (2002); pp. 178 
30
 Sierra, Rodrigo.  “The Role of Domestic Timber Markets in Tropical Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation in Ecuador: Implications for Conservation Planning and Policy.”  Ecological Economics.  Vol. 
36.  (2001); pp. 329. 
D = MB 
S = PMC 
Qo Units of Marketable 
Forest products 
Price 
SMC 
Q’ 
DWL 
Externality Model for Forest 
Products (Figure 2) 
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MBC = MBES 
MCC  = foregone MBF 
Qo 
Market for Conservation (Figure 3) 
QConservation/QEcosystem Services 
Price 
Po 
Where MC=MB the optimum quantity of 
conservation/ecosystem services Qo results.  This suggests 
that resources are neither over nor underallocated. 
enters such a pristine environment.  Run-off may negatively affect local water supply, in 
terms of clarity and turbidity, which in turn may disturb the lifecycles of indigenous 
cultures and local flora and fauna.  If these actions don’t result in disease or death these 
members of the local population may instead be forced to migrate.   As indigenous 
peoples, and of course flora and fauna, are not members of the community market their 
concerns often remain unheard regarding issues of logging and other forms of forest 
product production.  These represent just some of consequences of this oversupply of 
forest products. 
 Negative externalities such as these can be relieved through methods of 
conservation.  It is true, though, that a certain amount of resource exploitation may be 
socially beneficial.  This efficient amount of resource exploitation can also be looked at 
in a converse approach.  Instead we can look at the efficient amount of tropical forest 
conservation (of ecosystem services). 
 
3.3 Optimal Conservation 
 As we look at Figure 3 we 
are reminded of the same market in 
Figure 1 (pg. 6).  We must 
remember that demand in this 
market does not truly exist without 
regulatory measures.  So we 
consider such a market strictly in terms 
of the marginal cost and marginal 
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benefit of conservation/ecosystem services.  First of all, the aggregate benefit of all units 
of conservation (or each additional unit of ecosystem services conserved) makes up the 
curve represented by MBC=MBES.  This curve is downward sloping, which means that 
each additional unit of C or ES (conservation or ecosystem services respectively) will 
provide a lower benefit than the unit before it.  The aggregate cost of all units of 
conservation/ecosystem services (which is equal to the aggregate foregone benefit of 
these same units) is reflected in the curve labeled MCC=foregone MBF.  This curve is 
upward sloping which suggests that each additional unit of ecosystem services provides a 
greater cost (or foregone benefit) than that which came before it.    Where these two 
curves intersect we can find an optimal quantity of conservation/ecosystem services, Qo.  
This quantity represents the efficient allocation of resources towards conservation and 
ecosystem services in which these resources could have gone to no better societal 
enhancing use.  There is no deadweight loss at this particular quantity unlike in figure 1 
at Q’ (pg. 6).  Any other quantity of conservation and ecosystem services (ceteris 
paribus31) would result in a misallocation of resources towards these services which 
would then result in a deadweight loss. 
 It is troubling, though, that perfect information is not to our advantage in this 
case.  Unless we can estimate the true value of ecosystem services it will be difficult to 
measure their absolute marginal benefit and marginal cost.  The result of this could lead 
to an imperfect allocation of resources, in which a deadweight loss may exist.   
Many public goods are difficult to quantify in terms of true economic value.  For 
example, the air we breathe is certainly considered priceless by some; nevertheless a 
certain amount of pollution may be socially allowable as long as the benefits (in terms of 
                                                 
31
 Latin for “with all other things being equal” 
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resource use) exceed the costs.  How do we measure these costs and benefits?  As 
mentioned earlier, Costanza, et al., states that we evaluate such “unquantifiable” goods 
every day.32 
Valuation methods for ecosystem services do in fact exist, though they are as of 
yet imperfect.  Science has not yet caught up with society’s needs.  We have not yet 
developed the tools to evaluate all areas of the environment; claims Barbier “our current 
understanding of key ecological and economic relationships is sufficient to value only a 
handful of ecological services.”33  This typifies the information failure mentioned earlier 
in this section.  There is certainly is hope, though, that this problem will lessen over time 
with technological and intellectual advancement.   
 Another key issue regarding the development of valuation tools for ecosystem 
services is the dynamic nature of their state.34  We cannot appropriately consider their 
social value in a static context, which provides significant challenges.  As such, models 
are typically very complex and, ideally, must differ from ecosystem to ecosystem.  An 
example of such a system is currently in development at the Gund Institute for Ecological 
Economics at the University of Vermont.35  Their project looks to modeling, data 
collection, valuation and outreach as a way of attempting to comprehend the value of 
natural capital throughout the planet.36  Still, some question the ability to assess such 
                                                 
32
 Costanza, et al. 6 
33
 Barbier 179 
34
 Raghunandan, D. “Environment and Development under Capitalist Globalisation.”  Social Scientist. Vol. 
31, No. 9/10. (Sep.-Oct., 2003); pp. 38 
35
 For their website see http://www.uvm.edu/giee/?Page=default.html 
36
 Gund Institute for Ecological Economics: University of Vermont.  2007.  U of Vermont.  Dec. 10, 2007  
<http://www.uvm.edu/giee/?Page=default.html#introduction> 
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complex processes,37 while others stress that there is continued improvement in 
ecosystem service valuation all of the time, though we have not reached a sufficient 
understanding as of yet.38,39 
 It may partially be this lack of understanding regarding the true value of 
ecosystem services that contributes to the aforementioned externality and public goods 
market failures.  If more ecosystem services information becomes readily available there 
is the potential for an improved understanding of the monetary value they provide.  
Without proper action, however, the market failures list above (i.e. public goods and 
externalities) will remain.  These market failures affect every person on this planet to 
some degree.  Quite simply it is the job of all countries to take action in this regard.  As 
the World Bank stated in a recent document, “global public goods concerns all countries, 
rich and poor, and they can no longer be separated from national interests.”40 
 
IV. Ecuador Case Study 
 Ecuador, being a largely forested country, was watching when in September 2007 
a group of eight developing countries, aptly titled the Forestry Eight, became global 
lobbyists within issues of conservation.  The Forestry Eight included the following 
members Brazil, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Gabon, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Congo 
                                                 
37
 Gregory, Robin, Sarah Lichtenstein, Thomas C. Brown, George L. Peterson, Paul Slovic. “How Precise 
Are Monetary Representations of Environmental Improvements?”  Land Economics. Vol. 71, No. 4. (Nov., 
1995); pp. 471 
38
 Deutsch, Lisa, Carl Folke, Kristin Skånberg. “The critical natural capital of ecosystem performance as 
insurance for human well-being.” Ecological Economics.  Vol. 44. (2003); pp. 214 
39
 Barbier 213 
40
 Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund On the Transfer of 
Real Resources to Developing Countries.  Global Public Goods: A Framework for the Role of the World 
Bank.  Sept. 28, 2007.  November 11, 2007.  
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/21510685/DC2007-
0020(E)GlobalPublicGoods.pdf>. 
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and Indonesia.41  These countries alone make up for 80% of the tropical rainforests in the 
world.42  This group set out to demand that developed countries compensate developing 
countries for the conservation of their tropical rainforests as part of new greenhouse 
reduction standards.  In the run up to the Kyoto talks in Bali in December 2007 Indonesia 
and this Forestry group began to recruit other rainforest countries into their coalition, 
including Ecuador.  Global warming is certainly one of this generation’s most significant 
political hot-buttons.  This method of compensation for conservation has the potential to 
gather wide-spread support as conservation can often come cheaper than reducing carbon 
emissions.  This is useful because as Boyland points out “forests have the potential to 
sequester and store carbon that otherwise would be in the atmosphere contributing to 
global warming.”43  In November of 2007 Ecuador President Rafael Correa publicly 
announced Ecuador’s support for this group and their cause.44 
 Throughout the 20th century Ecuador’s demand for cultivated land and pasture 
resulted in nearly 90% of the deforestation in the country, though it should be noted that 
much of this area had already been harvested for timber.45  Migrant agricultural farmers 
are also to blame for much of the deforestation within the Amazon basin of Ecuador.46  In 
an empirical study Didia suggests that debt and deforestation are, statistically, positively 
                                                 
41
 Aglionby John and Fiona Harvey.  “Forest Nations Press for Carbon Credits to Help Cut Greenhouse 
Gas.”  Financial Times  (Sept. 13, 2007): Oct. 24, 2007.  
<http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=forest+nations+press+for+carbon+credits&y=0&aje=true&x=0
&id=070913001353&ct=0>. 
42
 Ibid 
43
 Boyland, Mark.  “The Economics of Using Forests to Increase Carbon Storage.”  Canadian Journal of 
Forest Research.  Vol. 36, No. 9 (Sept. 2006); 2232 
44
 Pathoni, Ahmad.  “Ecuador Backs Indonesia Bid for Forest Compensation.”  Reuters UK  (Nov. 26, 
2007): Dec. 06, 2007.  <http://uk.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUKJAK23478720071126>. 
45
 Wunder, Sven.  “Ecuador Goes Bananas; Incremental Technological Change and Forest Loss.”  
Agricultural Technologies and Tropical Deforestation. (2001); pp. 168. 
46
 Pinchón, Francisco J. “Colonist Land-Allocation Decisions, Land Use, and Deforestation in the 
Ecuadorian Amazon Frontier.”  Economic Development and Cultural Change.  Vol. 45, No. 4. (July 1997); 
pp. 737. 
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and significantly related.47  Ecuador ranks as number seventy-one in the world in public-
debt at thirty-three percent of their GDP (as of 2006).48     
 In 2005 Ecuador was ranked 142nd in the world in GDP per capita49 (at $4500 
US), thus suggesting a high level of poverty within its borders.  Government action to 
prevent poverty and devoting resources to promote conservation seems to be conflicting 
goals.  Though conservation and ecosystem service preservation carry great benefit, the 
prevention of global warming and resource preservation, etc. will not be immediately 
noticeable.  That is why conservation remains to be an action that specifically considers 
long-term repercussions.  However, poverty brings with it short-term difficulties.  
Ehrhardt-Martinez suggests that deforestation and rural poverty have a well established 
relationship.50  This often results in ecosystem encroachment in the form of general 
settling and/or slash-and-burn techniques (which in itself adds to greenhouse gases).  
Poverty also creates an immediate demand for economic security.  This pressing 
obligation certainly leads to higher rates of resource depletion which is the case in 
Ecuador. 
 The land within the ITT Block, residing right in the heart of the Yasuní National 
Park on the eastern reaches of the Amazon Forest, holds one of the largest remaining oil 
reserves in the world, an estimated 1.5 billion barrels of oil.51  These oil reserves are 
directly in the middle of one of the richest ecosystems on the planet.  In fact, Sierra 
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D = MBC = MBES 
S = MCC  = foregone MBF 
Qo 
Market for Conservation for the ITT 
Block in Ecuador (Figure 4) 
QConservation/QEcosystem Services 
Price 
Q’ 
A 
B 
C 
D 
Po 
Where S=MC=MB=foregone MBF we end up with the 
optimum quantity Qo.  Without any form of demand 
the current quantity level is at Q’.  The DWL is 
reflected by triangle ABC and the foregone benefit is 
reflected by area BCD. 
reveals that “this region has been considered one of the ‘hot spots’ of the world; areas 
with high and unique biodiversity but where environmental degradation is occurring at a 
fast pace.”52   
President Correa’s demands for compensation to conserve the ITT Block were 
fairly significant, but economically commendable, demanding one half of Ecuador’s 
foregone benefit (in terms of lost oil revenue, development, etc.) associated with 
conserving this area.  Indeed, if we were to look at the market for conservation/ecosystem 
services we would consider that for every unit of conservation, those who have the rights 
to these forests (the Ecuadorian Government) incur some level of foregone benefit.   
 Figure 4 signifies the market 
for conservation/ecosystem services 
within the ITT Block in the Amazon 
Forest of Ecuador.   Do to the lack of 
demand, as discussed in 3.1, there is 
a deadweight loss represented by 
triangle ABC.  Conversely, if the 
methods of conservation mentioned 
earlier were to allow for the optimal 
quantity of conservation, Qo, triangle ABC 
would correspond to the social welfare gain associated with this efficient allocation of 
resources towards conservation.  Accordingly the area denoted by triangle BCD 
represents the area associated with the forgone marginal benefit that results from this 
reallocation of resources.    
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When President Correa suggests compensation up to half the point of Ecuador’s 
foregone benefit associated with conservation it is likely he is considering the area 
mentioned above (BECD), or at least one-half of it.  Granted it should be considered that 
perhaps some of this foregone marginal benefit is distributed beyond the borders of 
Ecuador53.  Nevertheless, it is reasonable to state that much of it would directly affect the 
forest’s home country.  The reasons for this include immediate ecosystem service benefit, 
not available beyond borders, such as water regulation, soil retention, etc.  It is somewhat 
curious however that Ecuador would not ask the market price, Po, at the optimum 
quantity level.  However, it may be that this is merely a political move needed in order to 
ensure the success of such a program. 
 In November of 2007 President Correa decided to cancel plans for oil exploitation 
in the ITT Block.54  This came days after an environmental workshop took place in 
Quito, the capital of Ecuador, in which plans for compensation were laid out.  The 
governments of Spain, Italy, and Norway as well as philanthropists from the United 
States planned to contribute to this compensation fund.55 
 Accordingly, it is of little surprise that President Correa is backing calls for forest 
compensation on the behalf of developed countries for those in the developing world, 
such as Ecuador.  Though as of this paper’s completion the results of the Bali talks are 
not yet known it is clear that this movement is picking up steam as a way of preventing 
climate change.  It must be acknowledged that all ecosystem services in this particular 
conservation scheme do not seem to be completely acknowledged.  This is because the 
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focus here is on carbon sequestration, in regards to global warming.  So these tropical 
forest ecosystems may be undervalued to some extent.  Still, this provides a necessary 
step in preventing costly ecosystem service loss throughout the world. 
 There are various difficulties in regards to compensating these developing 
countries.  For example, any investment in conservation by a developed nation requires 
some long-term assurance of the ecosystem’s viability.  It cannot be expected that in a 
less-than-perfectly stable country large initial funds will guarantee conservation if by 
chance the government were to be dissolved.  Therefore, there is a need for methods in 
which compensation is developed in a manner that allows for year-to-year assurance.  
There are various methods where compensation can be developed, as will be discussed in 
the next section. 
 
V.  Policy Suggestions 
5.1 Basic Approach 
Generally market-based projects work better within countries that are market-
based economies.  The uncertain property right characteristics and instability of non-
market economies provides little assurance in the way of natural resource management.  
Didia suggests that democracies provide checks and balances which, in turn, enable more 
sustainable exploitation of natural resources.56  Though the type of government is not 
under question stability, as far as resource management is concerned, is.  Due to potential 
complexities related to the issues suggested it is important to consider the situation of a 
developing country before entering talks to compensate them for the conservation of an 
ecosystem.   
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 Ferraro claims that “performance payments (compensation) create incentives for 
local residents to have an active stake in protecting ecosystems.”57  As such, 
compensation can be given to land owners or the government, whoever manages the 
property rights of the targeted tropical forest.  Transaction costs may be less when 
dealing with one larger manager, but property right situations depends upon the countries 
in question and their laws.  Regardless of the property manager it is still likely that 
without compensation these land owners will direct resources towards the next best thing 
(i.e. tropical forest resource exploitation). 
 
5.2 Specific Policy Suggestions 
 Investing in poverty reduction programs may hit right at the core of this entire 
situation.  If poverty is one of the key reasons for deforestation, as mentioned earlier, then 
such a method of investment would compensate while at the same time relieve some of 
the direct pressures being put on the forests themselves.  This is an idea that would 
require country and region-specific implementation.  In the end this could be utilized as a 
partial solution within a larger compensatory package. 
 Over the last couple of decades debt-for-nature swaps have grown into a common 
practice in the world of conservation.  According to Sheeran the partial debt-relief offered 
by these debt-for-nature swaps is a profound example of the willingness and ability of 
developed countries to pay for the ecosystem services within developing countries.58  
Didia suggests, however, that due to the high demand for fuelwood and foreign exchange, 
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we cannot depend on debt-for-nature swaps to completely relieve deforestation rates.59  
Demand for this tactic would change if the free-riding issue was resolved, making the 
demand for fuelwood and foreign exchange a somewhat irrelevant issue.  Other reasons 
for this tend to focus on the political instability of the compensated country.  Specifically, 
Dauvergne points out that “institutionalized corruption and a centralized military 
leadership make (debt-for-nature swaps) unrealistic.”60  Debt-for-Nature swaps, as a 
result, should not be seen as a be-all-end-all solution to deforestation but they certainly 
could play a role in a larger picture of compensation. 
 Another option for compensation could be the ability for a developing country to 
receive special drawing rights from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Special 
drawing rights were originally used to support stability during the Bretton Woods Fixed 
Exchange Rate system, which ended in 1973.  The fund today is in part used as an 
exchangeable reserve asset.  This would provide these countries with increased liquidity 
allowing easier exchange throughout the world.  The objective of this would be the 
stimulation of the economy of the developing countries involved.  This is, of course, 
assuming the capable nature of the government and economic system within the 
developing country.  There may be less interest in this program from developing 
countries if it is estimated that the short-run effect is too little.  However this as well 
could be part of a larger compensatory package. 
Furthermore, if a global emissions market comes to fruition the allocation of 
carbon credits could become a potential method for compensation as well.  Carbon 
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credits are permits that allow for a certain level of carbon dioxide to be emitted.  In 
trading a potential commodity like this, those who are most willing and able to pay for 
them would have the opportunity.  Interestingly, while developing countries, such as 
Ecuador, may not be able to conserve given other immediate needs, they can exchange 
land use rights (hypothetically for conservation) for such commodities like carbon 
credits.  These credits can boost their economy in industrial areas, generally relieving 
some of the pressures related to the need for ecosystem destruction through resource 
depletion.  Such a process would allow a developing country to meet global standards in 
emissions while remaining able to compete in the global economy.  Carbon credits could 
provide these countries an opportunity to become competitive while remaining 
economically sustainable. 
 
5.3 Sustainability Methods and Accountability 
 Any kind of packaged deal for compensation must be approached with long-run 
sustainability in mind.  Paying a large chunk of money to a developing country does not 
necessarily decrease the risk of future deforestation.  It is therefore important to ensure 
payments remain at a long-term level.  With the instability of government within many 
developing countries it should be a priority to have strict enforcement of any such 
agreement.  A government should not be able to break a deal simply to acquire the short-
term benefits of deforestation.  Any compensation deal must be made in such a way that 
both sides of the contract are held accountable for their actions in a specifically 
determined period of time.  This deal must also take into account a reasonable discount 
rate.  A lower discount rate will likely receive greater support of the developing country 
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as it would suggest greater future value of an ecosystem.  However it is important to 
choose a responsible discount rate that benefits both sides. 
 This concept of accountability is quite important in regards to all sorts of 
contracts.  International contracts require international enforcement.  Consequently, it is 
necessary that an international organization is borne or transformed to accommodate such 
contracts.  They must have the power necessary to enforce promised action.  Perhaps a 
spin-of of the IMF or World Bank would suffice, or maybe a new branch of the United 
Nations.  Whatever the answer, a powerful group must be created in order to enforce 
either side of such compensation contracts.  Without enforcement, the value of these 
contracts could be limited to nothing. 
 In the situation suggested above, ecosystems are more or less rented for their 
ecosystem service output.  On the other hand, land on which tropical forests reside could 
potentially be fully marketable.  Perhaps an international organization, or national 
government, would have the opportunity to purchase the rights to some tropical forest.  
This could provide the opportunity to ensure long-run conservation.  While there may be 
the possibility of land sales for conservation it is unlikely to occur, at least at a high rate.  
The reason for this is sovereignty issues, in which many countries are unlikely to give up 
a portion of their territory.  Also, any country or organization that may buy land may 
have the opportunity to also demand compensation, which would lead us back to the 
same position as that of “renting” tropical forests. 
 Before pursuing every tropical forest it is absolutely vital to consider political will 
and resources.  It is likely that it is not yet politically feasible to take on every country 
that produces international ecosystem services.  Therefore much initial work should go 
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into deciding which areas are in the most need of critical protection.  These areas will 
tend to be those often referred to as “hot spots.”61 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 Ecosystems provide a wide array of benefits to society in the form of ecosystem 
services.  Together these services form the basis for natural capital which supports much 
of life itself.  Carrying the traits of public goods these ecosystem services are subject to 
free-riding.  However methods of compensation for conservation would result in a 
demand for ecosystem services (which is now practically non-existent) that would reflect 
something much closer to the true marginal benefit for society.   
 The externalities in the forest products (marketable products associated with the 
exploitation of tropical forests) market may be directly related to the public goods issue.  
Demand for conservation/ecosystem services should increase via governmental action.  If 
this is the case then it is likely that those resources that are indeed extracted from tropical 
forests will then come from ecosystems of less societal value than those that are 
conserved.  This is assuming that information is readily available for comparing the true 
value of ecosystem services within different areas of tropical forests. 
 It is absolutely critical that information continues to improve regarding the value 
of ecosystem services.  This indeed does seem to be the trend; however it is important 
that more investment is put into the understanding of these critical and integral assets of 
our society and economy.  Once the valuation methods begin to reflect the true worth of 
ecosystem services it is likely that we will begin to see an appropriate allocation of 
resources towards conservation. 
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 When considering the value of ecosystems it should be noted that no two areas are 
identical.  Therefore great care must be placed in the valuation of such capital assets, as 
every relationship within an environment is reflected in some form of natural capital.  
Cost-benefit analysis should be undertaken within each prominent ecosystem in order to 
determine the optimal level of conservation. 
 It should also be worthwhile to accept that not every problem has a simple 
solution.  The conservation of one ecosystem does not imply the conservation of another.  
Areas are different, the benefits and costs are different, and politics are different.  Focus 
should remain on areas of which society receives the greatest benefit.  If the value 
provided by ecosystem services becomes readily comprehensible, perhaps someday these 
services will be become viable commodities in the world’s economy.  Carbon credits 
represent this potential to some extent today, as they are tradable in return for promises of 
conservation.   
 The world is heading towards a time in which conservation in developing 
countries is compensated by developed countries.  In fact the World Bank has devoted 
$160 million toward a Forest Carbon Partnership facility.62  Ecosystem services are 
vastly misunderstood and carry many traits that have lead to the market failures in 
conservation and forest product markets we see today.  Our economy is greatly dependent 
on many of the services provided by tropical forests.  With more information regarding 
the value of ecosystem services to society and a stronger role taken by government, or 
some supranational organization, in compensatory measures we can protect much of the 
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economically-beneficial services provided by tropical forests around the world.
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Appendix 1 63 
Function Ecosystem Infrastructure and Processes Goods and Services (examples) 
Regulation Functions Maintenance of essential ecological processes and life support systems 
1 
Gas regulation Role of ecosystems in 
biogeochemical 
cycles 
Provides clean, breathable air, 
disease prevention, and a habitable 
planet 
2 
Climate 
regulation 
Influence of land cover and 
biological mediated processes 
on climate 
Maintenance of a favorable climate 
promotes human health, crop 
productivity, recreation, and other 
services 
3 
Disturbance 
prevention 
Influence of ecosystem 
structure on dampening 
environmental disturbances 
Prevents and mitigates natural 
hazards and natural events, generally 
associated with storms and other 
severe weather 
4 
Water 
regulation 
Role of land cover in regulating 
runoff and river discharge 
Provides natural irrigation, drainage, 
channel flow regulation, and 
navigable transportation 
5 
Water supply Filtering, retention and storage 
of fresh water (e.g. in aquifers 
and snow pack) 
Provision of water for consumptive 
use, includes both quality & quantity 
6 
Soil retention Role of vegetation root matrix 
and soil biota in soil retention 
Maintains arable land and prevents 
damage from erosion, and promotes 
agricultural productivity 
7 
Soil formation Weathering of rock, 
accumulation of organic matter 
Promotes agricultural productivity, 
and the integrity of natural 
ecosystems 
8 
Nutrient 
regulation 
Role of biota in storage and 
recycling 
of nutrients 
Promotes health and productive soils, 
and gas, climate, and water 
regulations 
9 
Waste treatment Role of vegetation & biota in 
removal or breakdown of xenic 
nutrients and compounds 
Pollution control/ detoxification; 
Filtering of dust particles through 
canopy services 
10 Pollination Role of biota in movement of floral gametes 
Pollination of wild plant species and 
harvested crops 
11 Biological 
control 
Population control through 
trophic-dynamic relations 
Provides pest and disease control, 
reduces crop damage 
Habitat Functions Providing habitat (suitable living space) for wild plant and animal species 
12 
Refugium 
function 
Suitable living space for wild 
plants and animals 
Maintenance of biological and 
genetic diversity (and thus the basis 
for most other functions) 
13 Nursery function 
Suitable reproduction habitat Maintenance of commercially 
harvested species 
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Production Functions Provision of Natural Resources 
14 
Food Conversion of solar energy into 
edible plants and animals 
Hunting, gathering of fish, game, 
fruits, etc.; small scale subsistence 
farming & aquaculture 
15 
Raw materials Conversion of solar energy into 
biomass for human construction 
and other uses 
Building and manufacturing; fuel and 
energy; fodder and fertilizer 
16 Genetic 
resources 
Genetic material and evolution 
in wild plants and animals 
Improve crop resistance to pathogens 
& pests 
17 
Medicinal 
resources 
Variety in (bio)chemical 
substances in, and other 
medicinal uses of, natural biota 
Drugs, pharmaceuticals, chemical 
models, tools, test and essay 
organisms 
18 
Ornamental 
resources 
Variety of biota in natural 
ecosystems with (potential) 
ornamental use 
Resources for fashion, handicraft, 
jewelry, pets, worship, decoration & 
souvenirs 
Information Functions Providing opportunities for cognitive development 
19 Aesthetic information 
Attractive landscape features Enjoyment of scenery 
20 
Recreation Variety in landscapes with 
(potential) recreational uses 
Travel to natural ecosystems for 
ecotourism, 
outdoor sports, etc. 
21 
Cultural and 
artistic 
information 
Variety in natural features with 
cultural and artistic value 
Use of nature as motive in books, 
film, painting, folklore, national 
symbols, architecture, advertising, 
etc. 
22 
Spiritual and 
historic 
information 
Variety in natural features with 
spiritual and historic value 
Use of nature for religious or historic 
purposes (i.e., heritage value of 
natural ecosystems and features) 
23 
Science and 
education 
Variety in nature with scientific 
and educational value 
Use of natural systems for school 
excursions, etc. Use of nature for 
scientific research 
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